On May 27, 2008, the Western Prospector board released a
Directors’ Circular in response to Khan's offer to purchase all
of the outstanding shares of Western Prospector. In that
document their special committee gave a number of reasons for
rejecting the offer. Subsequent to that, the CEO of Western
Prospector provided media interviews and elaborated on some of
those reasons.
Below are some comments and clarifications for interested
shareholders in order to allow them to make an informed
decision.
|
WESTERN Comment |
KHAN Clarification |
|
“The Khan Offer does not reflect the underlying value of
Western’s assets”
and that “Khan is attempting to gain control of
Western without paying an appropriate change of control
premium”
(Western Directors’ Circular) |
KHAN'S OFFER PROVIDES A GENEROUS PREMIUM AND IS
ACCRETIVE TO WESTERN PROSPECTOR SHAREHOLDERS BECAUSE:
·
Khan’s offer represents a premium of 34% based on
the 20 day volume weighted average trading prices of
Khan and Western prior to announcement of Khan’s' Offer
·
Khan’s offer represents an approximate $43 million
NPV premium to Western shareholders
·
Western shareholders would have access to a mining
licensed project
·
Western shareholders would receive 40% of the
combined entity’s stock in exchange for providing only
32% of its
U3O8
assets
·
Western shareholders would have access to a management
and board of directors who have collectively built
and operated over 30 producing mines in their
careers |
|
“The
share exchange ratio under the Khan Offer does not
reflect the relative merits of Western’s assets as
compared to Khan’s assets”
(Western Directors’ Circular) |
KHAN'S OFFER PROVIDES FULL AND FAIR VALUE FOR WESTERN
SHARES BECAUSE:
·
The underlying value of both companies is measured in
pounds of
U3O8
·
Western’s Gurvanbulag has an estimated 22M lbs of
U3O8
and
Khan’s share of the Dornod is estimated to be 46M
lbs of
U3O8
·
Western shareholders would contribute 32% of the
NI 43-101 compliant assets to the combined entity and
would receive approximately 40% of the combined
entity’s stock
·
Western
U3O8
resource is 13.6M lbs indicated and 8.6M lbs inferred
while Khan
U3O8 resource is 44.4M lbs
indicated of which 39M lbs is a probable reserve and
also has 1.7M lbs of inferred resource. The Khan asset
is of a more advanced category. |
|
“Khan’s offer of US$10M represents a 95% discount to the
Gurvanbulag deposit completely on its own”
which is based on a $241M Net Present Value (NPV)
assuming a long term Uranium price of $84/lb.
(The Northern Miner May 27, 2008 in interview with CEO
of Western) |
KHAN'S OFFER IS NOT A DISCOUNT AND PROVIDES WESTERN
SHAREHOLDERS WITH AN ACCRETIVE SHARE OF THE COMBINED NPV
BECAUSE:
·
Western’s Gurvanbulag has an NPV of $241M at a long-term
uranium price of $84/lb of
U3O8
·
Khan’s share of Dornod has an NPV of $469M at a
long-term uranium price of $84/lb of
U3O8
·
Khan’s offer would create a combined company with an NPV
of $710M of which Western shareholders would receive 40%
or $284M
·
Khan’s offer fully values the Gurvanbulag deposit and is
accretive to Western shareholders by $43M of NPV
·
Khan’s offer has no cash component and therefore the
$10M number is not accurate |
|
“In a nutshell we’re on a fast track to production… Khan
has a long way to go both from a dewatering and
feasibility perspective as well as from an
infrastructure perspective”
(The Northern Miner May 27, 2008 in interview with CEO
of Western) |
KHAN IS BEST POSITIONED TO BRING
DORNOD AND THE SADDLE HILLS REGION INTO PRODUCTION AT
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE BECAUSE:
·
There are three key steps that must be completed before
either the Dornod or Gurvanbulag project can be brought
into production
1.
Investment Agreement with the Government of Mongolia
- No production will occur without it. While neither
Khan or Western currently has an Investment Agreement,
Khan believes that a combined entity will be more likely
to successfully negotiate that agreement
2.
Conversion of Exploration Licenses into Mining Licenses - No mine
development can proceed until the exploration licenses
at both projects are converted into mining licenses.
Khan already has one mining license. All of Western’s
licenses are exploration licenses. The timing on the
conversion process is unknown.
3.
Lead Time for Equipment
- No production can occur without large production
equipment such as a SAG mill and other large key
equipment. Neither company has made an order as of yet
and the lead-time to receive it is a minimum of between
18 months and three years.
·
The lead time for equipment provides Khan with ample
opportunity to dewater and build infrastructure without
delaying its production schedule. In fact, Khan has
quite deliberately delayed its previously scheduled
dewatering efforts to avoid risking capital before an
Investment Agreement is completed |
|
“The challenges for Khan are that it will have to spend
millions of dollars to dewater the mine”
(The Northern Miner May 27, 2008 in interview with CEO
of Western)
|
THE STATUS OF DEWATERING IS NOT A CONCERN BECAUSE:
When Western
partially de-watered the Gurvanbulag deposit there were
many challenges. This resulted in delays and cost
overruns. The reason Khan can reasonably expect to not
have these same difficulties is that the majority of the
development at Dornod will be done in competent basaltic
formations that are in ‘waste’ rock. This has been
confirmed by extensive core drilling and studies
completed by Golder Associates. Also all the shafts in
Khan’s Dornod deposit are concrete-lined which will
reduce the need for extensive remediation |
|
“The Khan Offer is timed opportunistically to
disadvantage Western Shareholders and only gives the
illusion of an offer premium”
(Western Directors’ Circular) |
TIMING OF THE OFFER BENEFITS BOTH KHAN AND WESTERN
SHAREHOLDERS BECAUSE:
·
There is a general election in Mongolia in late June
2008 and Khan believes there is a potential window for
negotiations with the government just after the election
·
Khan believes a unified Saddle Hills uranium interest
will have greater success negotiating during the window
·
It is better to unify the two companies now before large
and potentially duplicative production expenses are
incurred and synergies are lost
·
The premium includes a 34% premium to the stock price as
described in the offer, a $43M NPV premium as described
above and 40% of a 68M lbs
U3O8 resource that is more
advanced |
|
“The synergies of the combined entity cited by Khan are
overstated and would primarily accrue to the Khan
Shareholders at the expense of the Western Shareholders”
(Western Directors’ Circular) |
PROPOSED TRANSACTION WITH KHAN RESULTS IN SIGNIFICANT
SYNERGIES BECAUSE:
·
The synergies and their financial benefit have been
conservatively estimated based on Khan’s Pre-Feasibility
study and Western’s Preliminary Economic Assessment
·
By building one processing plant instead of two, even
with the increased cost to handle additional capacity,
is a large and obvious capital synergy
·
Obvious infrastructure cost savings of building and
maintaining a combined camp, tailings management, and
administrative facilities |
|
“The complexity of Khan’s ownership structure could be
detrimental to the value realized by Western
Shareholders”
(Western Directors’ Circular) |
KHAN'S JOINT VENTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF
MONGOLIA IS A POSITIVE FEATURE OF ITS OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURE BECAUSE:
·
Khan’s ownership interest in the Dornod property
includes the Government of Mongolia as a joint-venture
partner
·
Khan continues to believe that having the government of
the country where the project is located as a partner
will be beneficial to building and maintaining a good
relationship with that same government
·
This belief has only been strengthened by the Government
of Mongolia's stated intention to own a portion of all
uranium deposits in Mongolia |
|
"Khan has established a soliciting dealer group and… has
agreed to pay brokers for Western Shares tendered to the
Khan Offer." (Western Directors Circular) |
Khan has NOT established a soliciting dealer
group and has NOT agreed to pay brokers for
Western Shares tendered to the Khan Offer. Khan
believes that its offer stands on its own and warrants
recommendation on its merits. |
|
“A superior proposal may emerge as a result of the
Board’s pursuit of other value-maximizing alternatives”
(Western Directors’ Circular) |
KHAN'S OFFER PROVIDES THE BEST STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE
BECAUSE:
·
A superior proposal has not emerged to date
·
Khan believes that the offer and resulting combined
company which would unify the Dornod and Gurvanbulag
Projects is and will prove to be the most attractive
alternative for Western shareholders |
|
Khan financial advisor |
Haywood Securities engaged July 9, 2008
|